Introduction
Of the different ways of tackling social problems among young people, prevention strategies have traditionally had a strong foothold in Swedish policy. This prophylactic idea has been identified as a driving force behind the formation of the welfare state during the twentieth century (Ekström von Essen, 2003) . It has paved the way for an extensive public responsibility for different areas of life, both to promote well-being via general provisions and to prevent troublesome delinquent behaviour through targeted programmes. Sweden was also early to launch a national crime prevention council, doing so in 1974, as well as creating a national policy in this area (Andersson, 2005) . The meaning and understanding of this effort have been challenged in recent years by a zero-tolerance policy and tough strategies with respect to drugs (Lenke & Olsson, 2002) , signalling a more punitive attitude towards crime among members of the public (Demker, Towns, DuusOtterström, & Sebring, 2008 ) and a more sanction-oriented crime policy (Estrada, Pettersson, & Shannon, 2012) .
However, prevention is still a prime focus of Swedish youth policy (Andersson et al., 2016) , and this is exemplified by the national crime prevention programme Together Against Crime, which was enacted in 2017. The central messages in the policy are a call for deepened collaborations, the appointment of coordinators to facilitate crime prevention efforts, and a more structured use of systematic data (for example, local and national crime surveys). Including these components follows the traditional pathway characterising crime prevention policy both in Sweden specifically and in the Nordic countries in general (Takala, 2005) , and can be seen in the policies of many other countries through its discourse of community safety and prevention partnerships (Crawford, 1998; Gilling, 2001) .
The current Swedish crime prevention policy is just one expression of how to improve prevention through practices that connect state authorities and local actors (e.g. Wilström & Torstensson, 1999) . A common denominator for these local crime prevention strategies is the great trust in collaboration between cross-sectoral and inter-professional partnerships (Forkby & Turner, 2016; Johansson, 2014) , often set up and facilitated by social services.
The data for this article come from two studies of crime prevention partnerships in Sweden, the names of which show the close affinity they have with the community safety approach: Young & Safe in Gothenburg (YSG) and Mobilizing Safety Work (MSW), also based in Gothenburg (which is the second largest city in Sweden, with approximately 570,000 inhabitants). Both were broadly commissioned to prevent youth disturbances, social disorder, and youth gangs. A fundamental strategic choice in the efforts of both projects was to appoint coordinators as leading actors. These were assigned to facilitate collaboration by taking an independent role and to function as 'organisational exceptions', detached from traditional organisational boundaries, with fixed positions and strict bureaucratic regulations.
Aim
The aim of this article is to describe and analyse the interplay between coordinators and stakeholders involved in crime prevention partnerships in Sweden, and thereby understand the challenges associated with demands for changes in work routines and the use of systematic data. The analysis focuses on the role of coordinators and their attempts to influence planning and interventions, the legitimacy such actions require, and the counterstrategies employed by the targeted stakeholders and discussed as lessons to be learned for managing crime prevention partnerships. The aim connects to three research questions:
1. How do those involved in the partnerships and the coordinators themselves perceive coordinators' roles and assignments? 2. What strategies and what kinds of data do the coordinators make use of when influencing the planning and application of preventive interventions? 3. What characterises the interplay between the coordinators' strategies and the partners' resistance and counterstrategies, and how does this affect the coordinators' strategies for gaining legitimacy?
In addressing these questions, the article will focus on two possible keys to success or failure that have been suggested in policy-making and the partnership literature (e.g. the Morgan report, 1991) . The first is that an (independent) coordinator with administrative support is crucial to whether partnership approaches will succeed, and the second is that the crime prevention measures that are undertaken should be grounded in systematic data concerning local crime situations and should be deliberately weighed against alternatives.
Collaboration partnerships as a perennial answer
The concept of collaboration through partnerships can be understood within the framework of governance in late modernity. In place of top-down ruling from the central state, there are horizontal semiindependent network structures at the regional and local levels that connect to the central state through trust and normative discourses (Dean, 1999; Villumsen & Kristensen, 2016) . Still, the centrality for collaboration in Swedish youth crime prevention policy is not really novel, but follows a long tradition (Edvall Malm, 2012) . For example, a government report from 1958 on 'social police officers' argued for better collaboration, common objectives, and mutual understanding between social services and police (Polisverksamhetsutredningen, 1958) . Starting from the assumption that better collaborations had to be formed between child protection services, police, and schools, policy recommendations became inclusive of more and more actors who would employ a whole-society strategy, and thus actors in the leisure sphere and in independent youth associations in civil society and the private sector were to be considered in the proposed partnerships (e.g. Justiedepartementet, 1996) . Since the beginning of the 1980s, different forms of collaborative partnership and safe city approaches have been a 'mantra' for international crime control and prevention discourses (Crawford & Cunningham, 2015) . Social problems and crime are viewed as multi-faceted phenomena with complex aetiologies that require systematic data, expert knowledge, and overlap between professional domains and different organisational and civil society territories. Collaboration is held to be a primary mechanism behind these strategies; however, working in this way can be very difficult both generally (Huxham & Vangen, 2005) and specifically with regards to youth, crime, and delinquency (Edvall Malm, 2012) , and might even work contrary to the aims of the collaboration and thus result in disappointment and an array of disillusioned prevention actors (Walters, 1996) .
(w)hilst partnerships have become a dominant feature in the local governance landscape, their realization remains precarious and considerable debates persist about what makes for good partnership working. (Crawford & Cunningham, 2015, p. 72) The integration of systematic data in strategic and operative decision-making can be seen as a way to delimit the scope of uncertainty, making calculated risks possible, finding objective grounds for joint action, and, as a consequence, decreasing the risk of criticism and, potentially, legitimacy crises (Kemshall, 2010; Power, 2007) . Together with collaborative action facilitated from independent coordinators, the use of systematic data provides the central pillars of the partnership idea. However, even if these are thought to be acting as mutually reinforcing entities towards a common goal, there could be tensions between them, causing them to fail to reach their potential. For example, the coordinators' potential knowledge use stemming from systematic data (perhaps coming from crime surveys) could convince other parties to work in a certain direction, but they could also experience a threat in the form of agents external to the organisation gaining influence over their priorities, and thus protect their borders by downplaying the coordinators' authority and legitimacy. Formulation of official organisational policy and the day-to-day dealings with pressing tasks have a tendency to follow separate pathways (Weick, 1976) .
The cases
YSG was, as it was being studied from 2005 to 2008, a citywide collaboration led and mainly funded by the local public housing company (responsible for more than 70,000 apartments). YSG was later restructured, with its leading, freestanding position being dissolved, and its tasks were divided and assigned to the involved partners. The study of MSW started in 2013 and ended in 2015. MSW is still active in and funded by the district of Angered, one of the more socially disadvantaged parts of Gothenburg, with about 50,000 inhabitants. While the coordinators still maintain a relatively freestanding position, this has been challenged due to having been organised as a line manager-led new unit within the social services responsible for community and safety. The MSW can, in many respects, be seen as mirroring the YSG at the local level.
There are significant overlaps in the objectives between the two cases, as they were both organised to prevent gang association and social disturbances (local youth 'riots'), and they both relied on collaboration as their primary tool. The coordinator's role was broadly to facilitate the overall processes by providing a structure to meetings, holding and spreading information about the current situation regarding the youth scene, and assisting joint strategies (Forkby & Johansson, 2016) .
In addition to these goals, YSG also aimed to promote sustainable development to help keep city districts free from narcotics and to improve self-confidence among young people after leaving school. The goals for MSW were also specified as improved school attendance and better contact between parents and schools, as well as the promotion of meaningful and structured leisure-time activities. YSG was originally established as an answer to an escalation in violence between gangs, for example, the then-recent shootings at a public beach, and MSW was a response from social services to gang-related crimes in which a series of robberies had been committed by some young persons living in the district. The main orientation of both YSG and MSW was collaboration between public authorities, but YSG also included collaboration with private enterprises, whereas MSW was also engaged in community work and mobilisation in civil society. There are also commonalities in that their coming into being depended on top politicians (YSG) and top officials (MSW), and the overall agenda-setting was shared between the coordinators and their respective steering groups.
YSG established a layered structure with a central steering group reflecting the stakeholders (the city, the police, and the prosecutor's office), with top-level officials providing a mandate for the overall work. Connected to this were five local steering groups covering the 21 city districts that existed then. A group of eight coordinators (of which four were social work professionals) assigned to different areas and reflecting the major stakeholders were employed to facilitate the implementation. The choice of appointing the public housing company as the process leader was done to prevent any party that was already involved from having too much influence in deciding what activities to engage in and by what means (Forkby, 2008; Forkby & Larsen, 2005) .
In MSW, three coordinators, all professionally trained social workers, were employed by social services. They were placed at the same level as the second-line managers, but without functional power (cf. Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006) or responsibility for employees. Their coordination of a collaboration structure (SSPF) between social services, the schools, the police and the youth (leisure) work (see also Söderberg, 2016) was central in identifying and organising joint activities. The steering group for SSPF, which comprised middle-level managers from the included partners, was also formally responsible for a substantial part of the coordinators' tasks. In accordance with their independent role, they corresponded with and acquired their mandate just as likely from the head of the department as from their formal superior in the hierarchy.
Research method
The two prevention models were followed for approximately 2.5 years each. This article adopts a meta-perspective to find general commonalities in ideas and implementation hindrances that were previously reported separately (Forkby, 2008; Forkby & Johansson, 2016) . The rational for focusing on two projects with somewhat different aims is based on the similarities between them with respect to the idea of being independent actors facilitating collaboration and also what seemed to be similarities in the reactions they encountered from their partners. Combing the data could potentially reveal some more general mechanisms working in these kinds of partnerships, despite the difference in time between them. The author has also been in relatively close contact with the two projects even after the individual studies ended, so ideas and thoughts have been discussed with them directly.
Common to the two research projects was the mixed-method design, which included interviews, observations of steering groups, collaboration activities, and surveys. An ethnographic framework guided the use of different data: for example, direct observations and informal conversations were important in order to understand the raison d'être of different activities, while data from interviews and surveys provided a sense of the personal perspectives of those involved. The analyses aimed to understand the sense-making and interaction processes as well as to identify the mechanisms at work behind them (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1989; Pawson & Tilley, 2000; Spradley, 1979) .
The primary data used for this article come from 51 interviews, including interviews with coordinators (5 interviews in YSG, 10 in MSW), top-level officials in steering groups (9 interviews in YSG, 9 in MSW), and managerial-level personnel (10 interviews in YSG, 8 in MSW). The interviews were semistructured and broadly followed a thematic guide (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009) , with topics focusing on the context for crime prevention efforts, how the interviewees experienced the situation and problems concerning young people, their organisation's capacity to cope with them, how they perceived the values, ideas and contributions from YSG or MSW, and how they viewed the joint activities and collaboration efforts (including good practice and hinderances) in general. The topics were chosen to obtain broad knowledge of how they perceived their role as partners in relation both to the youth situation and to other stakeholders -and potential power struggles. The data on the situation for youth is not a part of the analysis for this article since the focus is on the interplay between stakeholders in the partnership. The interviewer took an active role in following up on emerging or unclear issues and questions (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995) . The interviews took from 45 to 90 minutes, were recorded digitally, and were transcribed verbatim.
The analysis was theory-driven and guided by a couple of themes and clusters of sensitising concepts (Blumer, 1954; MacFarlane & O'Reilly-de Brún, 2012) , informed mainly from organisational theory and collaboration literature. The analytic model (Figure 1 ) was based on human service organisations theory, which relates to how people, acting as 'raw material', are processed by professional actors using different technologies and mindsets within an institutional framework (Hasenfeld, 2010) .
It included the field of problems related to how the living area, groups of young people, and individuals were perceived, together with the character of the people processing, which refers to strategic and operative practices and what kind of data were used to support them. Further, the analysis looked at the coordinators' roles and strategies, and their need for legitimacy to function in the interface zones between the involved organisations. These were all important to investigate the assumed partners' boundary work and therein how claims showing alignment or resistance were made in order to protect or transgress organisational territories (Lamont & Molnár, 2002) . Counterstrategies are understood as ways of showing resistance. Their appearance and how they were delivered was interpreted, for example, as having the intentional effect of protecting one's boundaries without being recognised as an act of resistance (May & Buck, 2000) .
The data were coded according to the different concepts and were then scrutinised in search of commonalities, variations, and contradictions. For each theme, a couple of questions were developed to protect from any drift in scope and understanding. Emerging themes and concepts were coded throughout the process separately from the analytic model. Field notes and first-hand knowledge collected through observations and informal discussions were used to help with the analyses of the interviews and to construct and finalise the thematic structure. The coding and analysis of both projects was originally discussed both with the research team to control for inter-coder validity and with the coordinators involved in the study. Different understandings and codings were discussed and, if need be, were related to theoretical perspectives and checked with other data to reach a consensus. Emergent typologies were grounded in a reading of thematised interviews and learning how to understand them in relation to theoretical perspectives, previous research and the first-hand knowledge of the practices, which came through observations.
The included quotations were chosen to show how different topics were understood; they have been slightly edited to enhance readability and to redact possible clues that could compromise the anonymity of the interviewees. 
Results
The results will first focus on the coordinators' capacity to fulfil their tasks by focusing on their legitimacy. Following this is a section that concentrates on different strategies that were used and how they functioned. The results section ends with a discussion on the involved stakeholders' responses that connects issues of legitimacy and the reception of the coordinators' strategies.
The coordinator's role and influence
Both YSG and MSW shared the assumption that addressing social disturbances, gang involvement, and delinquent behaviour would benefit from appointing agents to act independently, that is, in a 'free role' with respect to the main actors present on the youth prevention scene (mainly social services, schools, the police, and civil organisations). The mission for these organisational exceptions was to work in-between the organisations and to align actors from various sectors towards common goals and joint strategies.
As reflected in formal interviews, informal discussions and surveys conducted with participants in the partnership, there was a general commitment to collaboration and the importance of proactive crime prevention. However, while there were generally positive attitudes in the steering groups, there was much more tension in relation to the responsible actors at lower levels. Their independent role was not accepted everywhere and the coordinators had dissimilar personal mandates. For YSG, the hindrances were especially obvious with respect to coordinators without social work training and with a former association with the housing company, or with the police in relation to social services. For MSW, counterstrategies for downplaying their influence were more often experienced by coordinators who were newer in their positions than ones with more experience. This might be interpreted as a problem in how to translate legitimacy gained by personal knowledge and interpersonal relations into legitimacy based on a functional role in an organisation. One line of criticism targeted the legitimacy of the YSG coordinator under the mandate that they were unauthorised to make claims on their professional and organisational territory.
If one enters from the outside, for example, from a housing company or is a journalist [referring to non-social workers of the YSG staff] […] It's problematic when you blend in people in these kinds of activities who don't have the competence. It's those who have knowledge about the area who should have the mandate to change things, not those without. (Manager-level official, social services) This reaction could be seen in relation to the offensive roles employed sometimes by the YSG. They were not happy just to smooth out the organisational interfaces; they also wanted to challenge the status quo and bring about more fundamental changes.
We asked about how they dealt with these young people within the social services and got the answer: 'Well, we work as we always do'. But in my opinion, they're doing nothing. (Coordinator, YSG) Even if acceptance was generally greater for MSW coordinators, they also experienced criticism when they tried to use their independent role to make an impact.
Sometimes I think that [the coordinators] come here and make demands and really have strong claims. Giving us a kind of order, 'We need you to do this because we [are the ones who] can see the problem'. These situations have not been at all comfortable to deal with. (Manager-level official, social services)
In MSW, the coordinators could also express strong opinions about the ways things were being done in different agencies and how the work was organised. Most often, such commentary referred to social services.
I think it's a case of bad priorities. They [the social services] are stuck to their documents; they go in for it, and everyone just talks about, 'You've got to write and write', and sometimes they spend whole days just writing. (Coordinator, MSW).
Systematic data in strategic and operative work
As mentioned above, the use of systematic data is a standard recommendation for crime prevention. But this can refer to very different things when used in a planning phase of strategies or incorporated in operative work. Strategic work refers here to pre-planned actions that include a deliberate choice of actions and often includes several partners, and operative work refers to what is actually used in response to an actual problem and people. Systematic data in these practices could, for example, come from surveys on the local crime situation, mapping of problematic areas, and the more structured identification of the risks and potentials for groups and individuals. Unsystematic data could refer to different opinions of involved stakeholders drawn from spontaneous thoughts during a meeting. One can typically define four ideal types of practices in this respect (Figure 2) . MSW and YSG involved themselves both in strategic and operative work. One Type 1 example can be mentioned, namely the network analysis requested by the police that preceded the start of YSG and that identified 4 of the 21 city districts most affected by gang recruitment (Johansson, 2004) . Also, functioning as preparatory work was a mapping in MSW of young persons and groups that resulted from asking involved stakeholders to report on those in need of attention. These preparatory measures did have some importance at the start, but they were later overridden. So as to avoid stigmatising certain districts, it was decided after a year that the YSG model should be employed throughout the city and not just in the four districts targeted at the start. In MSW, the number of reported juveniles gave an idea of the magnitude of the problem and this pilot study showed how a more systematic collaboration could be achieved. The actual youngsters were, however, not addressed in any particular way. Overall, strategy formulation together with systematic data played a very limited role in the practice of the coordinators or in the projects as a whole.
Type 2 practices -strategic work without systematic data -played a more important role, not least in the planning phase in the districts involved in YSG. This could be realised as meetings framed by socio-pedagogical thinking, such as the Future Workshops -a stakeholder's meeting framed by a specific method leading the group through phases such as problem identification, brainstorming and prioritising ideas, and planning for future work. They were organised in advance of a specific problem, gathering the partners to form strategies and thereby relying heavily on what came to their heads at the time and place of the specific event. The coordinators' aim was to facilitate collaboration between the actors and thereby identify essential problems, formulate goals, and suggest intervention/prevention measures, but reference was seldom made to more systematic data.
There were intentions at least to develop Type 3 practices in both YSG and MSW, reacting operatively towards a specific situation, and thereby make use of systematic data. For example, within YSG one 'experiment' led by the coordinators was to choose three young people at risk who might benefit from a closer collaboration and more innovative interventions. Focusing on these appointed at-risk individuals, stakeholders involved in the partnership met for strategic work and to jointly assess risk and protective factors, and to form some general commitments to approaches. Systematic data were supposed to directly inform the work towards these appointed persons, not just general approaches or surveys of youth-at-risk. Typically, these experiments collapsed quite soon after they were introduced. It was difficult to find proper ways to make contact with the youths and their families and so when a concrete problem was encountered, the systematic data that had been collected were not of much help. Lastly, Type 4 practices -referring to operative work without systematic data -characterised the overwhelming majority of the actions of both YSG and MSW. Great trust was put in the structuring of meetings as a problem-solving device that could be organised to deal with emerging issues -be it local disturbances, 'riots', troublesome youth groups, and at-risk individuals, or as part of a structure for meetings of the SSPF. Even if the latter meetings included bi-weekly meetings with agendas that were decided in advance, there was actual problem-solving for specific problems (making them distinct from Type 2 practices). This depended largely on what the representatives focused on and presented at the specific meeting, and seldom relied on any more structured assessment or on ways to obtain data. The coordinator's role was mostly to maintain the structure of the meetings. This typically meant deciding whom to invite, drawing up the agenda, and, most prominently, chairing them and, thereby, controlling the order of speakers, making summaries, and proposing joint action plans, and then perhaps coordinating them.
The operative organising around individuals was often appreciated by the involved partners. The coordinators were found to be helpful in organising the joint work. In doing this, they were actionoriented, and if they asked for contextual knowledge it was no more systematic than that which could be gathered in their day-to-day practice. More critical standpoints were also noticed, not least concerning the strategic work and in how their leading figures were pointed out, and how the ownership of the ideas and the overall agenda was articulated. Reflecting on the ownership of ideas and action plans, a representative from the school argued that YSG had 'robbed' them of their ideas and called them their own.
For several years we have had some good methods in this district, and it's sad that those from Young and Safe haven't taken part in how we work here. These action plans that have been formulated have become the action plan of Young and Safe, but they mostly contain things we already did. (YSG, head of school, city district)
Resistance and counterstrategies
As in the cases presented here, implementation often includes the introduction of new actors and new 'logics' for action between the involved partners. Because top officials mandated them, it was not possible for the partners to just ignore YSG or MSW, even if they had wanted to. Therefore, those involved needed to develop coping strategies for the new environment, including some kind of resistance (Jensen, Johansson, & Löfström, 2006) . For their part, the coordinators had to be aware of possible counterforces and had to find ways to adapt to them. In this interplay, legitimacy can be seen as the coveted asset and trust enabling the involved to anticipate and agree upon each other actions as the currency that is employed (Huxham & Vangen, 2005) . Figure 3 presents a heuristic model that shows in a metaphorical way how the partners involved understood the coordinators of YSG and MSW and the coping strategies they employed towards them. In the model, positions are dichotomised into those who were enthusiastic and those who were hesitant about the coordinators' function. Even if a majority leaned towards the enthusiastic position, the presence of direct or indirect criticism and resistance played an important role in controlling the coordinators' actions by threatening their legitimacy. In other words, if the coordinators were able to make use of their independent 'catalytic' role, the partners' understanding of and mechanisms for coping with the coordinators indicated the demarcations of that role. Matching refers to how well YSG or MSW were seen as connecting to the partner organisations. Those in the enthusiastic position did not put much energy into their own previous work or experiences when defining their relation, and instead found themselves to be the point of departure when looking towards future practices. The matching aspect was more critical for the hesitant. They would not consider opening up their territory until their experiences and knowledge were recognised and accounted for. This coping is a kind of request or invitation to the coordinators to a transfer pointfirst, the coordinators must acknowledge the past and not accuse them of bad practice, then (maybe) they will be entitled to discuss the future. The basic logic of the partnerships was also understood differently. Some, such as a public prosecutor in YSG, explained the joy of sitting next to a partner from the housing company. Metaphorically speaking, the partnership was perceived as a public square that was open for meetings and dialogues that one might find interesting. The hesitant position embraced the partnerships with more suspicion. For example, while the MSW coordinators were promised invitations to different strategic meetings with line managers at social services, they were never actually given the invitations. The hesitant could have been suspecting a hidden agenda behind the strategies -worried about what power would emerge from the belly of the Trojan horse if it was welcomed into their territory.
The strategy the coordinators used was accepted by the positive partners as a quite uncontroversial matter of giving a structure to different meetings and occasions, thereby saving themselves time and energy. The hesitant, for their part, regarded the same structuring strategy with more suspicion. In particular, YSG was suspected by representatives of social services as aiming for a position of command, boosted into power from above in the hierarchy, and controlling what should be done, thereby limiting the representatives' own room to manoeuvre.
However different in form, both the enthusiastic and the hesitant used counterstrategies that served to protect their territorial claims. It was important for the enthusiasts to take initiative of the agenda and thereby project their ideas onto the partnerships they were confronted with, whether it be a routine for safeguarding a rapid response to young criminals from social services or to support social network intervention teams (Forkby, 2009) . In this way, at least some of the enthusiasts expanded their territory by colonialising the coloniser, i.e. making claims of the content of the intruder's agenda. In the hesitant position, the counterstrategy could be understood as a way of keeping a powerful watchdog happy. If they were not seen as paying the attention that was demanded, this could perhaps result in a bad standing with the master of the dog. Thus, the counterstrategy was a split between internal and external versions of their own participation. In situations where it was important to act in line with the coordinators, for example at the Future Workshops, they took the role of an engaged partner, but internally they nurtured another version in which they could be very critical towards the partnership. So, behind the impression of collaboration there were a great number of counterstrategies at work, resulting in legitimacy being clearly a case of how the coordinators managed the delicate negotiations and the balancing between different stakeholders and ideas.
Discussion
This article set out to describe and analyse the role of independent coordinators and the interplay between different stakeholders in partnerships and how different kinds of knowledge and strategies work to facilitate joint activities and to promote change. The coordinators can be understood as organisational exceptions, since they were thought to occupy a relatively free position in traditional hierarchical organisations. This independence was supposed to contribute to their legitimacy, since they were not controlled by one or the other stakeholder. Even if this was achieved when not perceived to challenge an involved stakeholder's claims of jurisdiction, the result of the studies also shows a great sensitivity in screening for potential threats in the partnerships, leading to struggles and negotiations over legitimacy and boundaries. This discussion will analyse legitimacy and trust as an outcome of negotiations and also as being indicative of the quality of the relations in the partnership as well as being crucial to whether any directional change whatsoever will be achieved (Huxham & Vangen, 2005) .
Although the notion of collaboration was widespread and honoured among the partners in the cases studied here, the legitimacy of the independent coordinators of YSG or MSW was not always acknowledged. Coordination of activities around targeted individuals or groups was most often welcomed, while quests for more fundamental changes, such as a move in social services from being 'stuck in their documents', resulted in criticism and counterstrategies aimed at devaluing their platform. From a boundary work perspective, the borders for an organisation are protected from external intruders and function to control workflows and processes (Bowker & Star, 2000) . From this perspective, it is natural that challenging (territorial) claims about who is invited to discuss the issues and in what ways strategies should be developed are scrutinised and often counteracted because these could potentially refocus the partners' attention in an undesired direction. This might demand an extensive proportion of their already tight resources and threaten to wrest the problem-formulating initiative out of their control. The issue can be understood as a question of how to cope with the coordinators as potential forceful intruders while still keeping up with daily work tasks, as had been traditionally done. However, because of mandated power from top officials, direct opposition from the partners could easily turn back on the criticisers themselves, and YSG got support from top politicians in the city and MSW from top officials. Open opposition in the wrong situations could return as criticism for hindering the common good and could lead to bad standing for those making the complaints. Borrowing the classic dramaturgical metaphor from Goffman (1959), opposition was articulated and exchanged between trusted allies 'backstage', and also to the researcher in informal conversation, and was more refined and indirect when demonstrated 'front stage' in public, as observed in the studies. These refined counterstrategies resulted in a split in versions of their own engagement -an official collaboration-friendly policy and an informal policy that was often more important and more protective of their own territory (cf. Weick, 1976) . In practice, a counterstrategy could, as one example, be seen in promises being made to the coordinators of open invitations to important planning meetings, without such invitations actually being delivered.
Shown in interviews and several occasions of informal talk, the coordinators were aware of, affected by, and troubled by these counterstrategies, but because of their refined character they had difficulty addressing them. An open accusation against a partner of being resistant could corner that partner, and it was also contrary to the coordinators' self-presentation as 'being on the good side'. The solution was two-fold. First, there was a similar split between external and internal versions of the partners, as indicated above. Second, the coordinators employed strategies in which they resisted forcing their ideas onto the partners' agendas and instead facilitated them in formulating strategies and ideas by themselves. The Future Workshops of YSG can serve as an example of this. Despite criticism for claiming ownership of their partners' ideas and strategies afterwards, the coordinators did not try to project their own ideas onto the agenda. The partners were invited to a structured process in which they were supposed to bring up and prioritise ideas that came into their minds at the time and place of the meeting, no matter whether these were well-grounded in systematic data, personal preferences, or just blueprint versions of some strategies they had come across. The downside of this strategy to build alliances and gain legitimacy as a reliable partner was the sacrifice of a more pro-active steering role of the coordinator, together with much of the systematic data-driven problem-based approaches, recommended ingredients in crime prevention policy (Shaw, 2010) . Thus, there was a paradoxwhile legitimacy was crucial for bring about changes in traditional thinking and practices, the strategies to obtain this had to take account of the partners' counterstrategies in a way that resulted in a loss of the power their legitimacy was supposed to be used for, with restricted possibilities of affecting their partners' agendas.
Conclusions
A possible conclusion from these studies is that resistance and counterstrategies should be given more attention when implementing partnership and collaboration strategies. In this vein, the result could be understood within more general processes of boundary work, functioning to define, claim, and protect one's territory from others, as seen, for example, in inter-group relations, and between professions and organisations (Lamont & Molnár, 2002) . However, boundary work can also be seen as a potential meeting place for debate and transgressing, not just as separating action (Bowker & Star, 2000) . This would imply an understanding of the mechanisms at work and addressing them proactively. Joint exploration of the forces that might challenge the intention of collaboration could present a better starting point than a mere adaption to general notions of the need for it. Collaboration is sometimes necessary but should be used with caution and grounded on an awareness of what constantly challenges it. Independent coordinators might be important for building up strategies, but acting in such a free role would then require training in collaboration management, and an awareness of the partner's different agendas that do not easily merge into a common one (Bardach, 2001; Hughes & Gilling, 2004) .
Limitations
The combination of the two studies were not planned for when they started, so the design regarding data collection and the first analysis could have been better synchronised. Even if the analysis in this article takes a meta-perspective and finds connecting themes, the data were originally gathered from somewhat different perspectives. Another issue concerns the passage of time in a rapidly changing policy field such as this one, especially since the YSG study ended in 2008. Even if the intention was to find similarities in positions and interactions that are present over time, this actual practice is outdated. Still, the author has continuously been in contact with the responsible actors from both MSW and YSG since the studies ended. This made it possible to follow and reflect upon changes and whether these affect the discussions in the present article. Some of the observations of strategies that were used might also have been understood in relation to the professions involved, but this theme was given less attention in favour of their inter-organisational environment.
The study of MSW took into consideration sensitive personal information in areas other than what were analysed in this article and was therefore sent to and approved by the research ethics board of Gothenburg (Dnr: 837-13). The YSG study did not consider such data.
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